Anonymity and Historical-Anonymity in Location-Based Services

  • Authors:
  • Claudio Bettini;Sergio Mascetti;X. Sean Wang;Dario Freni;Sushil Jajodia

  • Affiliations:
  • EveryWare Lab - DICo, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy;EveryWare Lab - DICo, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy;Department of CS, University of Vermont, USA;EveryWare Lab - DICo, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy;Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, USA

  • Venue:
  • Privacy in Location-Based Applications
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

The problem of protecting user's privacy in Location-Based Services (LBS) has been extensively studied recently and several defense techniques have been proposed. In this contribution, we first present a categorization of privacy attacks and related defenses. Then, we consider the class of defense techniques that aim at providing privacy through anonymity and in particular algorithms achieving "historical k- anonymity" in the case of the adversary obtaining a trace of requests recognized as being issued by the same (anonymous) user. Finally, we investigate the issues involved in the experimental evaluation of anonymity based defense techniques; we show that user movement simulations based on mostly random movements can lead to overestimate the privacy protection in some cases and to overprotective techniques in other cases. The above results are obtained by comparison to a more realistic simulation with an agent-based simulator, considering a specific deployment scenario.