Programming from specifications (2nd ed.)
Programming from specifications (2nd ed.)
The B-book: assigning programs to meanings
The B-book: assigning programs to meanings
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A semantic approach to secure information flow
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on mathematics of program construction
A Per Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs
Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation
A Refinement Theory that Supports Reasoning About Knowledge and Time
LPAR '01 Proceedings of the Artificial Intelligence on Logic for Programming
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
Preserving Information Flow Properties under Refinement
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
The Shadow Knows: Refinement and security in sequential programs
Science of Computer Programming
The shadow knows: refinement of ignorance in sequential programs
MPC'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Mathematics of Program Construction
How to Brew-up a Refinement Ordering
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security, Probability and Nearly Fair Coins in the Cryptographers' Café
FM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods
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"Classical" program development by refinement [12,2,3] is a technique for ensuring that source-level program code remains faithful to the semantic goals set out in its corresponding specification. Until recently the method has not extended to security-style properties, principally because classical refinement semantics is inadequate in security contexts [7]. The Shadow semantics introduced by Morgan [13] is an abstraction of probabilistic program semantics [11], and is rich enough to distinguish between refinements that do preserve noninterference security properties and those that don't. In this paper we give a formal development of Private Information Retrieval [4]; in doing so we extend the general theory of secure refinement by introducing a new kind of security annotation for programs.