Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
WMCSA '99 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computer Systems and Applications
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Nodes bearing grudges: towards routing security, fairness, and robustness in mobile ad hoc networks
EUROMICRO-PDP'02 Proceedings of the 10th Euromicro conference on Parallel, distributed and network-based processing
Scalable routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
RBC-OLSR: Reputation-based clustering OLSR protocol for wireless ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
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Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks assume that the nodes forming the network are either under a single authority, or else that they would be altruistically forwarding data for other nodes with no expectation of a return. These assumptions are unrealistic since in ad-hoc networks, nodes are likely to be autonomous and rational (selfish), and thus unwilling to help unless they have an incentive to do so. Providing such incentives is an important aspect that should be considered when designing ad-hoc routing protocols. In this paper, we propose a dynamic, decentralized routing protocol for ad-hoc networks that provides incentives in the form of payments to intermediate nodes used to forward data for others. In our Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol, game-theoretic approaches are used to calculate payments (incentives) that ensure both the truthfulness of participating nodes and the fairness of the CSR protocol. We show through simulations that CSR is an energy efficient protocol and that it provides lower communication overhead in the best and average cases compared to existing approaches.