From secrecy to soundness: efficient verification via secure computation
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Non-interactive verifiable computing: outsourcing computation to untrusted workers
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Improved delegation of computation using fully homomorphic encryption
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Randomness condensers for efficiently samplable, seed-dependent sources
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Two protocols for delegation of computation
ICITS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Theoretic Security
Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rational arguments: single round delegation with sublinear verification
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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We give a general reduction that converts any public-coin interactive proof into a one-round (two-message) argument. The reduction relies on a method proposed by Aiello et al. [1], of using a Private-Information-Retrieval (PIR) scheme to collapse rounds in interactive protocols. For example, the reduction implies that for any security parameter t, the membership in any language in PSPACE can be proved by a one-round (two-message) argument of size poly(n,t), which is sound for malicious provers of size 2 t . (Note that the honest prover in this construction runs in exponential time, since she has to prove membership in PSPACE, but we can choose t such that 2 t is significantly larger than the running time of the honest prover).A probabilistically checkable argument (PCA) is a relaxation of the notion of probabilistically checkable proof (PCP). It is defined analogously to PCP, except that the soundness property is required to hold only computationally. We consider the model where the argument is of one round (two-message), where the verifier's message depends only on his (private) randomness. We show that for membership in many NP languages, there are PCAs (with efficient honest provers) that are of size polynomial in the size of the witness. This compares to the best PCPs that are of size polynomial in the size of the instance (that may be significantly larger). The number of queries to these PCAs is poly-logarithmic.The soundness property, in all our results, relies on exponential hardness assumptions for PIR schemes.