Quantum-Secure Coin-Flipping and Applications
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
On the efficiency of classical and quantum oblivious transfer reductions
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Sampling in a quantum population, and applications
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Secure authentication from a weak key, without leaking information
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Fully simulatable quantum-secure coin-flipping and applications
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Classical cryptographic protocols in a quantum world
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Universally composable quantum multi-party computation
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Feasibility and completeness of cryptographic tasks in the quantum world
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
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We consider two-party quantum protocols starting with a transmission of some random BB84 qubits followed by classical messages. We show a general "compiler" improving the security of such protocols: if the original protocol is secure against an "almost honest" adversary, then the compiled protocol is secure against an arbitrary computationally bounded (quantum) adversary. The compilation preserves the number of qubits sent and the number of rounds up to a constant factor. The compiler also preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM), so if the original protocol was BQSM-secure, the compiled protocol can only be broken by an adversary who has large quantum memory and large computing power. This is in contrast to known BQSM-secure protocols, where security breaks down completely if the adversary has larger quantum memory than expected. We show how our technique can be applied to quantum identification and oblivious transfer protocols.