LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Human Identification Protocols
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
HB^+^+: a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Secure against Some Attacks
SECPERU '06 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Security, Privacy and Trust in Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing
HB-MP: A further step in the HB-family of lightweight authentication protocols
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
On the Security of HB# against a Man-in-the-Middle Attack
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
HB#: increasing the security and efficiency of HB+
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Authenticating pervasive devices with human protocols
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Parallel and concurrent security of the HB and HB+ protocols
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
GHB#: a provably secure HB-like lightweight authentication protocol
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Revisiting lightweight authentication protocols based on hard learning problems
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
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The Random - HB # protocol is a significant improvement of the HB + protocol introduced by Juels and Weis for the authentication of low-cost RFID tags. Random - HB # improves HB + in terms of both security and practicality. It is provably resistant against man-in-the-middle attacks, where the adversary can modify messages send from the reader to the tag and performs significantly better than HB + , since it reduces the transmission costs and provides more practical error rates. The only problem with Random - HB # is that the storage costs for the secret keys are insurmountable to low cost tags. The designers of the protocol have proposed also an enhanced variant which has less storage requirements, but it is not supported by a security proof. They call this variant just HB #. In this paper we propose a variant of the Random - HB #. The new proposal maintains the performance of the Random - HB #, but it requires significantly less storage for the key. To achieve that we add a lightweight message authentication code to protect the integrity of all the exchanged messages.