How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Mix-Networks on Permutation Networks
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
Advances in signatures, encryption, and e-cash from bilinear groups
Advances in signatures, encryption, and e-cash from bilinear groups
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A user friendly authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless communications
Computers and Electrical Engineering
A secure user-friendly authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless communications
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A mix is a cryptographic construction for anonymizing communications. Existing mixes require that the public key certificates of mix servers have been distributed among users. In this paper, we propose a new mix that uses techniques from identity-based cryptography. Our mix does not require any public certificates; as long as the users know the identities of mix servers, the mix can anonymize messages. We give proofs of correctness and privacy, as well as analysis of efficiency.