Multiagent graph coloring: Pareto efficiency, fairness and individual rationality

  • Authors:
  • Yaad Blum;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel;School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

  • Venue:
  • AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We consider a multiagent extension of single-agent graph coloring. Multiple agents hold disjoint autonomous subgraphs of a global graph, and every color used by the agents in coloring the graph has associated cost. In this multi agent graph coloring scenario, we seek a minimum legal coloring of the global graph's vertices, such that the coloring is also Pareto efficient, socially fair, and individual rational. We analyze complexity of individual-rational solutions in special graph classes where classical coloring algorithms are known. Multiagent graph coloring has application to a wide variety of multi agent coordination problems, including multiagent scheduling.