All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Towards a theory of knowledge and ignorance: preliminary report
Logics and models of concurrent systems
Minimal knowledge problem: a new approach
Artificial Intelligence
Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming (vol. 3)
Equality and Domain Closure in First-Order Databases
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Reasoning with Incomplete Information
Reasoning with Incomplete Information
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Specification of Nonmonotonic Reasonong
FAPR '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning
Temporal Theories of Reasoning
JELIA '94 Proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Only Persistence Makes Nonmonotonicity Monotonous
JELIA '96 Proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
A Temporal Model Theory for Default Logic
ECSQARU '93 Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty
Knowledge updates: semantics and complexity issues
Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning about confidentiality at requirements engineering time
Proceedings of the 10th European software engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
On the semantics of knowledge update
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Knowledge updates: Semantics and complexity issues
Artificial Intelligence
Hi-index | 0.00 |
An important characteristic of many logics for Artificial Intelligence is their nonmonotonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the consequences. There may, however, exist formulae that can always be safely added to the premises without destroying any of the consequences: we say they respect monotonicity. Also, there may be formulae that, when they are a consequence, can not be invalidated when adding any formula to the premises: we call them conservative. We study these two classes of formulae for preferential logics, and show that they are closely linked to the formulae whose truth-value is preserved along the (preferential) ordering. We will consider some preferential logics for illustration, and prove syntactic characterization results for them. The results in this paper may improve the efficiency of theorem provers for preferential logics.