Permissions and obligations

  • Authors:
  • L. Thorne McCarty

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey

  • Venue:
  • IJCAI'83 Proceedings of the Eighth international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 1983

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Abstract

This article describes a formal semantics for the deontic concepts -- the concepts of permission and obligation -- which arises naturally from the representations used in artificial intelligence systems Instead of treating deontic logic as a branch of modal logic, with the standard possible worlds semantics, we first develop a language for describing actions, and we define the concepts of permission and obligation in terms of these action descriptions. Using our semantic definitions, we then derive a number of intuitively plausible inferences, and we show generally that the paradoxes which are so frequently associated with deontic logic do not arise in our system.