Circumscribing equality

Authors:
Peter K. Rathmann;Marianne Winslett
Affiliations:
Computer Science Dept., Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Computer Science Dept., University of Illinois, Urbana, IL
Venue:
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Year:
1989

Citing 5
Cited 1

Saturation, nonmonotonic reasoning and the closed-world assumption

Artificial Intelligence
Applications of circumscription to formalizing common-sense knowledge

Artificial Intelligence
Circumscribing with sets

Artificial Intelligence
Pointwise circumscription

Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
Reasoning with Incomplete Information

Reasoning with Incomplete Information

Nonmonotonicity and the scope of reasoning: preliminary report

AAAI'90 Proceedings of the eighth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1

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Abstract

One important facet of common-sense reasoning is the ability to draw default conclusions about the state of the world. Such an abili ty enables one to assume, for example, that a given bird flies in the absence of information to the contrary. One drawback of the circumscriptive approach to common-sense reasoning has been its inability to produce default conclusions about equality. For example, generally one cannot tentatively conclude that President (USA) ≠ Fido using circumscription. In this paper we give a second-order axiom and model theory for circumscribing equality, and prove that they are equivalent.