On the relation between truth maintenance and autoepistemic logic

Authors:
Michael Reinfrank;Oskar Dressier;Gerd Brewka
Affiliations:
Siemens AG, Munich, FRG;Siemens AG, Munich, FRG;GMD, St. Augustin, FRG
Venue:
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Year:
1989

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Konolige has introduced a new version of autoepistemic logic (AEL), which is based on a strong notion of groundedness. We show that it is well-suited for formalizing the concept of justified belief in a non-monotonic truth maintenance system (TMS). If we consider the justifications of a TMS as formulae of the form it LaΛ¬Lb⊃c it computes the set of non-modal atoms of a strongly grounded AEL-extension. It is shown that a variant of Dressler's encoding of nonmonotonic justifications in an assumption-based TMS is correct, and thus also inherits the AEL semantics We argue that more work is needed to come to a better understanding of backtracking routines and so-called nogood inferences, which are identified as sources of ungrounded conclusions. These results contribute to bridging the gap between theory and implementation in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning.