A semantical approach to nonmonotonic logics
Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
General theory of cumulative inference
Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Non-monotonic reasoning
All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert systems
Logics and models of concurrent systems
Towards a theory of knowledge and ignorance: preliminary report
Logics and models of concurrent systems
Cumulative default logic: in defense of nonmonotonic inference rules
Artificial Intelligence
Generalized Kripke models for epistemic logic
TARK '92 Proceedings of the fourth conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
A logic of knowledge and justified assumptions
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic Logic II: Nonmonotonic Modal Theories
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Introduction to Default Logic
Reasoning with Incomplete Information
Reasoning with Incomplete Information
A Preferential Model Semantics For Default Logic
ECSQAU Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty
TARK '90 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
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A variant is proposed of the preference-based semantics for nonmonotonic logics that was originally considered by Shoham [1987; 1988]. In this variant it is not assumed that preferences between standard models are aggregated into one preference order. This allows the capturing of all main nonmonotonic formalisms, including Default Logic on Reiter [1980]. The preferential models introduced in this paper are motivated from an epistemic point of view, and are therefore called epistemic preference models. The consequence operations induced by epistemic preference models are characterized. Further, the view is defended that the rationality of cumulative monotonicity does not imply that nonmonotonic logics have to be cumulative, but only that a rational agent should not believe a set of default rules that induces a noncumulative consequence operation.