An inconsistency tolerant model for belief representation and belief revision

Authors:
Samir Chopra;Rohit Parikh
Affiliations:
Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, New York, NY;Computer Science, Mathematics and Philosophy, City University of New York, New York, NY
Venue:
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Year:
1999

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Abstract

We propose a new model for representing and revising belief structures, which relies on a notion of partial language splitting and tolerates some amount of inconsistency while retaining classical logic. The model preserves an agent's ability to answer queries in a coherent way using Belnap's four-valued logic. Axioms analogous to the AGM axioms hold for this new model. The distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs is represented and psychologically plausible, computationally tractable procedures for query answering and belief base revision are obtained.