eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Decision procedures for multiple auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Autonomous Bidding Agents in the Trading Agent Competition
IEEE Internet Computing
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Bidding Algorithms for Simultaneous Auctions: A Case Study
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Bidding under uncertainty: theory and experiments
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
The First International Trading Agent Competition: Autonomous Bidding Agents
Electronic Commerce Research
A comparison of bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Decision-theoretic bidding based on learned density models in simultaneous, interacting auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Bidding marginal utility in simultaneous auctions
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
AIS-ADM'07 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Autonomous intelligent systems: agents and data mining
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Bidding for multi-items in simultaneous auctions raises challenging problems. In multi-auction settings, the determination of optimal bids by potential buyers requires combinatorial calculations. While an optimal bidding strategy is known when bidding in sequential auctions, only suboptimal strategies are available when bidding for items being sold in simultaneous auctions. We investigate a multi-dimensional bid improvement scheme, motivated by optimization techniques, to derive optimal bids for item bundles in simultaneous auctions. Given a vector of initial bids, the proposed scheme systematically improves bids for each item. Such multi-dimensional improvements result in locally optimal bid vectors. Globally optimal bid vectors are guaranteed in the limit for infinite restarts. For ease of presentation we use two-item scenarios to explain the working of the algorithm. Experimental results show polynomial complexity of variants of this algorithm under different types of bidder valuations for item bundles.