Characterizing solution concepts in games using knowledge-based programs

Authors:
Joseph Y. Halpern;Yoram Moses
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, Cornell University;Department of Electrical Engineering, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
Venue:
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of knowledge-based programs. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementations of two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can be viewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.