Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Weighted super solutions for constraint programs
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Managing Risk in Recurrent Auctions for Robust Resource Allocation
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on STAIRS 2008: Proceedings of the Fourth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
Robustness in Recurrent Auctions for Resource Allocation
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Artificial Intelligence Research and Development: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Catalan Association for Artificial Intelligence
A q-learning based adaptive bidding strategy in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
DFCA: a flexible refundable auction for limited capacity suppliers
GECON'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Grid economics and business models
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Given a winning-bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction, finding an alternative repair solution of adequate revenue without causing undue disturbance to the remaining winning bids in the original solution may be difficult or even impossible. This "bid-takers exposure problem" may be preemptively addressed by finding a solution that is robust to winning-bid withdrawal. We introduce the concept of monotonicity-in-expectation. We provide impossibility results concerning truthful mechanisms for robust solutions with bounded social-welfare losses in which the bid-taker cannot rescind items from winning bidders to repair a solution. We also show that this result extends to combinatorial auctions that include a form of leveled-commitment contract. However, we present a positive result regarding truthfulness for combinatorial auctions in a restricted setting that comprises a computationally efficient allocation algorithm that seeks to maximize expected social welfare.