AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
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AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
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AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Beyond quasi-linear utility: strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
DFCA: a flexible refundable auction for limited capacity suppliers
GECON'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Grid economics and business models
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
False-name bidding in first-price combinatorial auctions with incomplete information
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A vickrey-type multi-attribute auction model
ICMLC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advances in Machine Learning and Cybernetics
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Generalizing envy-freeness toward group of agents
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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This paper introduces a new distinctive class of combinatorial auction protocols called price-oriented, rationing-free (PORF) protocols. The outline of a PORF protocol is as follows: (i) for each bidder, the price of each bundle of goods is determined independently of his/her own declaration (while it can depend on the declarations of other bidders), (ii) we allocate each bidder a bundle that maximizes his/her utility independently of the allocations of other bidders (i.e., rationing-free). Although a PORF protocol appears quite different from traditional protocol descriptions, surprisingly, it is a sufficient and necessary condition for a protocol to be strategy-proof. Furthermore, we show that a PORF protocol satisfying additional conditions is false-name-proof; at the same time, any false-name-proof protocol can be described as a PORF protocol that satisfies the additional conditions. A PORF protocol is an innovative characterization of strategy-proof protocols and the first attempt to characterize false-name-proof protocols. Such a characterization is not only theoretically significant but also useful in practice, since it can serve as a guideline for developing new strategy/false-name proof protocols. We present a new false-name-proof protocol based on the concept of a PORF protocol.