Prolegomenon to a theory of conservative belief revision

Authors:
James P. Delgrande;Abhaya C. Nayak;Maurice Pagnucco
Affiliations:
School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada;Department of Computing, Macquarie University, NSW, Australia;School of CSE, The University of New South Wales, NSW, Australia
Venue:
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Year:
2003

Citing 3
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Abstract

A standard intuition underlying traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change. In this paper we introduce a novel account of belief change in which the agent's belief state is modified minimally to incorporate exactly the new information. Thus a revision by p ∧ q will result in a new belief state in which p ∧ q is believed, but a stronger proposition (such as p Λ q) is not, regardless of the initial form of the belief state.