Applications of circumscription to formalizing common-sense knowledge
Artificial Intelligence
An approach to default reasoning based on a first-order conditional logic: revised report
Artificial Intelligence
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Probabilistic semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning: a survey
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision
Conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision
System Z: a natural ordering of defaults with tractable applications to nonmonotonic reasoning
TARK '90 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
A logic for revision and subjunctive queries
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Abduction as belief revision: a model of preferred explanations
AAAI'93 Proceedings of the eleventh national conference on Artificial intelligence
Modal logics for qualitative possibility and beliefs
UAI'92 Proceedings of the Eighth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
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Recently, the relationship between several forms of default reasoning based on conditional defaults has been investigated, In particular, the systems based on e-semantics, preferential models and (fragments of) modally-defined conditional logics have been shown to be equivalent. These systems form a plausible core for default inference, but are too weak in general, failing to deal adequately with irrelevance. We propose an extension of the (modal) conditional logics in which one can express the truth of sentences at inaccessible possible worlds and show how this logic can be used to axiomatize a simple preference relation on the modal structures of this logic. This preferential semantics is shown to be equivalent to 1-entailment and rational closure. We suggest that many metalogical systems of default inference can be axiomatized within this logic, using the notion of inaccessible worlds.