Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Combinatorial Auctions
Fairplay—a secure two-party computation system
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Algorithmic Game Theory
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Keyword Auction Protocol for Dynamically Adjusting the Number of Advertisements
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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We develop a secure keyword auction mechanism in which winners and payments are calculated without making bidding prices and CTRs public. First, we show that even if we utilize cryptographic techniques, the auctioneer can learn most bidding prices in existing keyword auction mechanisms, such as the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Thus we propose a new auction mechanism by introducing a simple but sufficient payment rule to prevent the leakage of bidding prices. The existing GSP is not strategy-proof, and neither is our new mechanism. However, possible manipulations are limited. We also propose a secure keyword auction scheme that securely realizes our mechanism by utilizing cryptographic techniques.