Recyclable PUFs: logically reconfigurable PUFs
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Side channel attacks and the non volatile memory of the future
Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems
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This paper shows how lasers can be used to implement modification attacks on EEPROM and Flash memory devices. This was achieved with inexpensive laser-diode module mounted on a microscope. By locally heating up a memory cell inside a memory array, the contents of the memory can be altered. As a result, the security of a semiconductor chip can be compromised. Even if changing each individual bit is not possible due to the small size of a memory cell, cryptographic keys can still be recovered with brute force attacks. This paper also discusses the limits for the safe use of lasers in semi-invasive attacks without damaging the device under test