Security vulnerability in a non-interactive ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme

  • Authors:
  • Woo Kwon Koo;Jung Yeon Hwang;Dong Hoon Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Information Management and Security, Korea University 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea;Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Daejeon, Republic of Korea;Graduate School of Information Management and Security, Korea University 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea

  • Venue:
  • Information Processing Letters
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Recently, a non-interactive identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed for achieving CCA-security. In the paper, we show that the identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme is unfortunately vulnerable to a collusion attack. The collusion of a proxy and a malicious user enables two parties to derive other honest user's private key and thereby decrypt ciphertexts intended for the honest user.