DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Achieving cooperation in multihop wireless networks of selfish nodes
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
An analytical approach to the study of cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Robust Detection of Selfish Misbehavior in Wireless Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Reliable data fusion in wireless sensor networks: a dynamic Bayesian game approach
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Sequential detection of misbehaving nodes in cooperative networks with HARQ
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
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Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.