A logical framework for default reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
On compact representations of propositional circumscription
Theoretical Computer Science
On the semantics of updates in databases
PODS '83 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD symposium on Principles of database systems
Nonmonotonic reasoning: from complexity to algorithms
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Two Proof Procedures for a Cardinality Based Language in Propositional Calculus
STACS '94 Proceedings of the 11th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Non-monotonic Syntax-Based Entailment: A Classification of Consequence Relations
ECSQARU '95 Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty
Recovering Consistency by Forgetting Inconsistency
JELIA '08 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Measuring inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning under inconsistency: A forgetting-based approach
Artificial Intelligence
Measures of inconsistency and defaults
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
On the measure of conflicts: Shapley Inconsistency Values
Artificial Intelligence
A framework for reasoning under uncertainty based on non-deterministic distance semantics
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Parallel belief revision: Revising by sets of formulas
Artificial Intelligence
Revising by an inconsistent set of formulas
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Two
Axiomatic characterization of belief merging by negotiation
Multimedia Tools and Applications
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In many frameworks for reasoning under inconsistency, it is implicitly assumed that the formulae from the belief base are connected using a weak form of conjunction. When it is consistent, a belief base B = {φ1..., φn}, where the φi are propositional formulae, is logically equivalent to the base {φ1 Λ ... Λ φn}. However, when it is not consistent, both bases typically lead to different conclusions. This illustrates the fact that the comma used in base B has to be considered as an additional, genuine connective, and not as a simple conjunction. In this work we define and investigate a propositional framework with such a "comma connective". We give it a semantics and show how it generalizes several approaches for reasoning from inconsistent beliefs.