A method to compress and anonymize packet traces
IMW '01 Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurement
On the design and performance of prefix-preserving IP traffic trace anonymization
IMW '01 Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurement
Introduction to Languages and the Theory of Computation
Introduction to Languages and the Theory of Computation
Measuring ISP topologies with rocketfuel
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
A high-level programming environment for packet trace anonymization and transformation
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Routing design in operational networks: a look from the inside
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An integrated experimental environment for distributed systems and networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Experiences building PlanetLab
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A repository of router configuration files from production networks would provide the research community with a treasure trove of data about network topologies, routing designs, and security policies. However, configuration files have been largely unobtainable precisely because they provide detailed information that could be exploited by competitors and attackers. This paper describes a method for anonymizing router configuration files by removing all information that connects the data to the identity of the underlying network, while still preserving the structure of information that makes the data valuable to networking researchers. Anonymizing configuration files has unusual requirements, including preserving relationships between elements of data, anonymizing regular expressions, and robustly coping with more than 200 versions of the configuration language. Conventional tools and techniques are poorly suited to the problem. Our anonymization method has been validated with a major carrier, earning unprivileged researchers access to the configuration files of thousands of routers in hundreds of networks. Through example analysis, we demonstrate that the anonymized data retains the key properties of the network design. The paper sets out techniques that could be used in an attempt to break the anonymization, and it concludes our anonymization techniques are most applicable to enterprise networks, because the large number of enterprises and the difficulty of probing them from the outside make it hard to recognize an anonymized network based solely on publicly-available information about its topology or configuration. When applied to backbone networks, which are few in number and many of whose properties can be publicly measured, the anonymization might be broken by fingerprinting techniques described in this paper.