Data networks
Low-rate TCP-targeted denial of service attacks: the shrew vs. the mice and elephants
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Controlling High-Bandwidth Flows at the Congested Router
ICNP '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols
An adaptive virtual queue (AVQ) algorithm for active queue management
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
CapProbe: a simple and accurate capacity estimation technique
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Exploiting the Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
BGP routing policies in ISP networks
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Distributed denial of service attack detection using an ensemble of neural classifier
Computer Communications
Multi-stage change-point detection scheme for large-scale simultaneous events
Computer Communications
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We propose a new stealthy DDoS attack model referred to as the "quiet" attack. The attack traffic consists of TCP traffic only. Widely used botnets in today's various attacks and newly introduced network feedback control are integral part of the quiet attack model. We show that short-lived TCP flows can be intentionally misused. The quiet attack is detrimental to the Internet traffic and at the same time difficult to be detected by using current defense systems. We demonstrate the inability of representative defense schemes such as adaptive queue management and aggregate congestion control to detect the quiet attack.