On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Towards an accurate AS-level traceroute tool
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Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
SIGMETRICS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
AS relationships: inference and validation
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Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
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SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
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Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
New attacks on timing-based network flow watermarks
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dissent in numbers: making strong anonymity scale
OSDI'12 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
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AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
PacketCloud: an open platform for elastic in-network services
Proceedings of the eighth ACM international workshop on Mobility in the evolving internet architecture
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Tor is an anonymous communications network with thousands of router nodes worldwide. An intuition reflected in much of the literature on anonymous communications is that, as an anonymity network grows, it becomes more secure against a given observer because the observer will see less of the network. In particular, as the Tor network grows from volunteers operating relays all over the world, it becomes less and less likely for a single autonomous system (AS) to be able to observe both ends of an anonymous connection. Yet, as the network continues to grow significantly, no analysis has been done to determine if this intuition is correct. Further, modifications to Tor's path selection algorithm to help clients avoid an AS-level observer have not been proposed and analyzed. Five years ago a previous study examined the AS-level threat against client and destination addresses chosen a priori to be likely or interesting to examine. Using an AS-level path inference algorithm with improved accuracy, more extensive Internet routing data, and, most importantly, a model of typical Tor client AS-level sources and destinations based on data gathered from the live network, we demonstrate that the threat of a single AS observing both ends of an anonymous Tor connection is greater than previously thought. We look at the growth of the Tor network over the past five years and show that its explosive growth has had only a small impact on the network's robustness against an AS-level attacker. Finally, we propose and evaluate the effectiveness of some simple, AS-aware path selection algorithms that avoid the computational overhead imposed by full AS-level path inference algorithms. Our results indicate that a novel heuristic we propose is more effective against an AS-level observer than other commonly proposed heuristics for improving location diversity in path selection.