On the generation of multivariate polynomials which are hard to factor
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An Identification Scheme Based on Sparse Polynomials
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
On obfuscating point functions
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the Impossibility of Obfuscation with Auxiliary Input
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proteus: virtualization for diversified tamper-resistance
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Private Searching on Streaming Data
Journal of Cryptology
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Obfuscation for cryptographic purposes
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Securely obfuscating re-encryption
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
A graph game model for software tamper protection
IH'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information hiding
Software integrity checking expressions (ICEs) for robust tamper detection
IH'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information hiding
PUF ROKs: a hardware approach to read-once keys
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
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Program Obfuscation that renders any given program essentially equivalent to a black box, while desirable, is impossible [4] in the general polynomial time adversary models. It is natural to search for positive results under restricted programs (e.g., point functions [20, 2] POBDDs [10], cryptographic primitives [17, 12, 13]. Here we study straight line arithmetic programs. Our model of obfuscation requires an attacker to produce the entire code only by looking at the obfuscated program. We show that obfuscation is possible, assuming factoring is hard and we have access to a tamper-resistant hardware (or secure token). We also assume that the programs can be sampled from some distribution. Our results are based on extending a result due to Shamir \cite{Sha93} on generation of hard to factor polynomials to straight line programs.