MYSEA: the monterey security architecture

Authors:
Cynthia E. Irvine;Thuy D. Nguyen;David J. Shifflett;Timothy E. Levin;Jean Khosalim;Charles Prince;Paul C. Clark;Mark Gondree
Affiliations:
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA;Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
Year:
2009

Citing 11
Cited 0

Multiple operating systems on one processor complex

IBM Systems Journal
A hardware architecture for implementing protection rings

Communications of the ACM
A note on the confinement problem

Communications of the ACM
Quality of security service

Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms
Design and Assurance Strategy for the NRL Pump

Computer
A Distributed System Reference Architecture for Adaptive QoS and Resource Management

Proceedings of the 11 IPPS/SPDP'99 Workshops Held in Conjunction with the 13th International Parallel Processing Symposium and 10th Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Starlight: Interactive Link

ACSAC '96 Proceedings of the 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Private Desktops and Shared Store

ACSAC '98 Proceedings of the 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Towards an Infrastructure for MLS Distributed Computing

ACSAC '98 Proceedings of the 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Analysis of the Intel Pentium's ability to support a secure virtual machine monitor

SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
A Distributed Secure System

Computer

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Mandated requirements to share information across different sensitivity domains necessitate the design of distributed architectures to enforce information flow policies while providing protection from malicious code and attacks devised by highly motivated adversaries. The MYSEA architecture uses component security services and mechanisms to extend and inter-operate with commodity PCs, commodity client software, applications, trusted components, and legacy single level networks, providing new capabilities for composing secure, distributed multilevel secure solutions. This results in an architecture that meets two compelling requirements: first, that users have a familiar work environment, and, second, that critical mandatory security policies are enforced.