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This position paper introduces lightweight cryptographic jails (CryptoJails) that protect the privacy of application data by intercepting write accesses and redirecting them to encrypted application containers. CryptoJails ensure that application data (for example, cached emails or web pages) cannot be read or undetectably altered by other applications. Unlike existing approaches, CryptoJails do not require kernel modifications or even superuser (i.e., root) privileges, do not impose significant performance overhead, and may even be used with already installed applications.