Efficiency improvements in constructing pseudorandom generators from one-way functions
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Password-authenticated session-key generation on the internet in the plain model
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Concurrent non-malleable zero knowledge proofs
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
On the black-box complexity of optimally-fair coin tossing
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Quantum commitments from complexity assumptions
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Black-Box Constructions of Protocols for Secure Computation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Universal one-way hash functions via inaccessible entropy
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Concurrent non-malleable statistically hiding commitment
Information Processing Letters
On definitions of selective opening security
PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
UOWHFs from OWFs: trading regularity for efficiency
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Limits of random oracles in secure computation
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Constant-round adaptive zero-knowledge proofs for NP
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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We give a construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes (those in which the hiding property holds against even computationally unbounded adversaries) under the minimal complexity assumption that one-way functions exist. Consequently, one-way functions suffice to give statistical zero-knowledge arguments for any NP statement (whereby even a computationally unbounded adversarial verifier learns nothing other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true, and no polynomial-time adversarial prover can convince the verifier of a false statement). These results resolve an open question posed by Naor et al. [J. Cryptology, 11 (1998), pp. 87-108].