A new fault cryptanalysis on montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm

Authors:
JeaHoon Park;KiSeok Bae;SangJae Moon;DooHo Choi;YouSung Kang;JaeCheol Ha
Affiliations:
Kyungpook National University, Daegu, Korea;Kyungpook National University, Daegu, Korea;Kyungpook National University, Daegu, Korea;ETRI, DaeJeon, Korea;ETRI, DaeJeon, Korea;Hoseo University, Cheonan, Korea
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Interaction Sciences: Information Technology, Culture and Human
Year:
2009

Citing 5
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Abstract

The Montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm is recognized as a very efficient countermeasure against Simple Power Analysis and C Safe-Error Attacks on RSA or elliptic curve cryptosystem. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of the Montgomery ladder algorithm to fault analysis attack when an error is injected during its operation in an embedded cryptographic chip. After injecting an error, we measure the power traced and compare it with an original correct trace. As a result, we can derive the secret key of the public-key cryptosystems such as RSA by computing the correlation coefficients of two power traces for correct and faulty cryptographic operations with same input.