Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Convex Optimization
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
Artificial Intelligence
Autonomous Spectrum Balancing for Digital Subscriber Lines
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Simultaneous Water Filling in Mutually Interfering Systems
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Convergence of Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm for Gaussian Interference Channels
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Inter-operator spectrum sharing from a game theoretical perspective
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing - Special issue on dynamic spectrum access for wireless networking
Efficient spectrum leasing via randomized silencing of secondary users
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
An architectural view of game theoretic control
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
A Radio Resource Management Framework for Multi-User Multi-Cell OFDMA Networks Based on Game Theory
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
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This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing iterative water-filling algorithm that studies the myopic users, this paper studies how a foresighted user, who knows the channel state information and response strategies of its competing users, should optimize its transmission strategy. To characterize this multi-user interaction, the Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced, and the existence of this equilibrium for the investigated non-cooperative game is shown. We analyze this interaction in more detail using a simple two-user example, where the foresighted user determines its transmission strategy by solving as a bi-level program which allows him to account for the myopic user's response. It is analytically shown that a foresighted user can improve its performance, if it has the necessary information about its competitors. Since the optimal solution of Stackelberg equilibrium is computationally prohibitive, we propose a practical low-complexity approach based on Lagrangian duality theory. Numerical simulations verify the performance improvements. Possible ways to acquire the required information and to extend the formulation to more than two users are also discussed.