Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation reporting mechanisms
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
TRAVOS: Trust and Reputation in the Context of Inaccurate Information Sources
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for information elicitation
Artificial Intelligence
Bayesian reputation modeling in E-marketplaces sensitive to subjecthity, deception and change
AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
CRM: An efficient trust and reputation model for agent computing
Knowledge-Based Systems
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We introduce a framework so that communities can exchange reputation information about agents in environments where agents are migrating between communities. We view the acquisition of the reputation information as a purchase and focus on the design of a payment function to facilitate the payment for information in a way that motivates communities to truthfully report reputation information for agents. We prove that in our proposed framework, honesty is the optimal policy and demonstrate the value of using a payment-function approach for the exchange of reputation information about agents between communities in multiagent environments. Using our payment function, each community is strengthened: it is able to reason more effectively about which agents to accept and can enjoy agents that are motivated to contribute strongly to the benefit of the community.