Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
How to Hash into Elliptic Curves
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
On two RFID privacy notions and their relations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A minimum disclosure approach to authentication and privacy in RFID systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Secure and practical threshold RSA
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Hi-index | 0.89 |
We discuss a recently proposed formal proof model for RFID location privacy. We show that protocols which intuitively and in several other models are considered not to be location private, are provably location private in this model. Conversely, we also show that protocols which obviously are location private, are not considered location private in this model. Specifically, we prove a protocol in which every tag transmits the same constant message to not be location private in the proposed model. Then we prove a protocol in which a tag's identity is transmitted in clear text to be weakly location private in the model.