A constant rounds group key agreement protocol without using hash functions

Authors:
Hua Zhang;Qiao-Yan Wen;Jie Zhang;Wen-Min Li
Affiliations:
State key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China;State key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China;State key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China;State key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
Venue:
International Journal of Network Management
Year:
2009

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Abstract

It is important to encrypt and authenticate messages sent over networks to achieve security. Network users must therefore agree upon encryption keys and authentication keys. The authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is used to provide authentication in communication systems. In this paper we present a group key agreement protocol without using one-way hash functions that are based on the DDH problem. The protocol achieves efficiency in both communication and computation aspects. We analyzed the security in the security model formalized by Bresson et al.