Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
On the price of anarchy in unbounded delay networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
A game-theoretic analysis of wireless access point selection by mobile users
Computer Communications
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
IEEE Wireless Communications
An overview of IEEE 802.21: media-independent handover services
IEEE Wireless Communications
Managing the last mile [access network]
IEEE Communications Magazine
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider a geographic area covered by two wireless networks. Assuming delay-sensitive users, we study the loss of efficiency of the user equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) in terms of total delay, with M/M/1 delay functions on each network. The user equilibrium is proved to be less efficient when the network is very heterogeneous, i.e. the two networks have different capacities. In order to elicit coordination among users, we suggest to use marginal cost pricing. We investigate the computation of the optimal taxes to use, and give several arguments in favor of the technical feasibility of such a scheme. Applying taxes therefore seems particularly well-suited to improve the overall performance of a network selection game with selfish users.