k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
A high-level programming environment for packet trace anonymization and transformation
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
IP covert timing channels: design and detection
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
The devil and packet trace anonymization
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
"A day in the life of the internet": proposed community-wide experiment
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Mapping internet sensors with probe response attacks
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
FLAIM: a multi-level anonymization framework for computer and network logs
LISA '06 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Large Installation System Administration
Issues and etiquette concerning use of shared measurement data
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Security against probe-response attacks in collaborative intrusion detection
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Large scale attack defense
Privacy-safe network trace sharing via secure queries
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Network data anonymization
Legal requirements and issues in network traffic data protection
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Network data anonymization
The risk-utility tradeoff for IP address truncation
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Network data anonymization
A taxonomy and adversarial model for attacks against network log anonymization
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
On the privacy risks of publishing anonymized IP network traces
CMS'06 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Home networks
Protecting user privacy with multi-field anonymisation of ip addresses
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security of information and networks
Relationships and data sanitization: a study in scarlet
Proceedings of the 2010 workshop on New security paradigms
AirLab: consistency, fidelity and privacy in wireless measurements
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Secret-sharing hardware improves the privacy of network monitoring
DPM'10/SETOP'10 Proceedings of the 5th international Workshop on data privacy management, and 3rd international conference on Autonomous spontaneous security
An architectural solution for data exchange in cooperative network security research
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security
A contextual privacy-aware access control model for network monitoring workflows: work in progress
FPS'11 Proceedings of the 4th Canada-France MITACS conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
A workflow checking approach for inherent privacy awareness in network monitoring
DPM'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference, and 4th international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security
"Un-googling" publications: the ethics and problems of anonymization
CHI '13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems
A privacy-aware access control model for distributed network monitoring
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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In recent years, academic literature has analyzed many attacks on network trace anonymization techniques. These attacks usually correlate external information with anonymized data and successfully de-anonymize objects with distinctive signatures. However, analyses of these attacks still underestimate the real risk of publishing anonymized data, as the most powerful attack against anonymization is traffic injection. We demonstrate that performing live traffic injection attacks against anonymization on a backbone network is not difficult, and that potential countermeasures against these attacks, such as traffic aggregation, randomization or field generalization, are not particularly effective. We then discuss tradeoffs of the attacker and defender in the so-called injection attack space. An asymmetry in the attack space significantly increases the chance of a successful de-anonymization through lengthening the injected traffic pattern. This leads us to re-examine the role of network data anonymization. We recommend a unified approach to data sharing, which uses anonymization as a part of a technical, legal, and social approach to data protection in the research and operations communities.