Bargain-based stimulation mechanism for selfish mobile nodes in participatory sensing network

Authors:
Xiaojuan Xie;Haining Chen;Hongyi Wu
Affiliations:
Center for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Lafayette, LA;Bethel College, Mishawaka, IN;Center for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Lafayette, LA
Venue:
SECON'09 Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE communications society conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
Year:
2009

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the Participatory Sensing Network (PSN) that consists of selfish participants stimulated by certain reward programs. We propose a bargain-based mechanism to encourage cooperative message trading among the selfish nodes to maximize their rewards. We state the necessary condition for feasible message transactions in a theorem. We model message transaction as a two-person cooperative game, and we apply Nash Theorem to obtain optimal solution which is fair and Pareto optimal. We also present a greedy algorithm to reach the optimal solution. The effectiveness of the bargain-based stimulation mechanism is studied by extensive simulations based on real mobility traces.