The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
GHT: a geographic hash table for data-centric storage
WSNA '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
ANODR: anonymous on demand routing with untraceable routes for mobile ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Receiver anonymity via incomparable public keys
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Intrusion Tolerance and Anti-Traffic Analysis Strategies For Wireless Sensor Networks
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Source-location privacy in energy-constrained sensor network routing
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Anonymous Secure Routing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
LCN '04 Proceedings of the 29th Annual IEEE International Conference on Local Computer Networks
Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor Network Routing
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Entrapping Adversaries for Source Protection in Sensor Networks
WOWMOM '06 Proceedings of the 2006 International Symposium on on World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
Attack-resistant location estimation in sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Towards event source unobservability with minimum network traffic in sensor networks
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Source location privacy against laptop-class attacks in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Adaptive backoff exponent algorithm for zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4)
NEW2AN'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking
Secure localization and authentication in ultra-wideband sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Part 1
Maelstrom: receiver-location preserving in wireless sensor networks
WASA'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Wireless algorithms, systems, and applications
Towards statistically strong source anonymity for sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
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Source location privacy is an important issue in sensor network monitoring applications. It is difficult to be addressed by traditional security mechanisms, because an external attacker may perform simple traffic analysis to trace back to the event source. Solutions such as flooding or using dummy messages have the drawback of introducing a large amount of message overhead. In this paper, we avoid using network-wide dummy messages by utilizing beacons at the MAC layer. Beacons are sent out regularly, which essentially forms a constant-rate of dummy messages. Using beacons to replace the dummy messages may increase the delivery delay of event information because beacons are only sent out at the predefined beacon interval, but this latency can be controlled. To do this, we propose a crosslayer solution in which the event information is first propagated several hops through a MAC-layer beacon. Then, it is propagated at the routing layer to the destination to avoid further beacon delays. Simulation results show that our cross-layer solutions can maintain low message overhead and high privacy, while controlling delay.