Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
Efficiency loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation
Efficiency loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation
Stability of end-to-end algorithms for joint routing and rate control
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Adaptive routing with stale information
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
On the efficiency of markets with two-sided proportional allocation mechanisms
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
On the efficiency of the simplest pricing mechanisms in two-sided markets
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We study resource allocation games, where users send data along paths and links in the network charge a price equal to marginal cost. When users are price taking, it is known that there exist distributed dynamics that converge towards a fully efficient Nash equilibrium. When users are price anticipating, however, a Nash equilibrium does not maximize total utility in general. In this paper, we explore the inefficiency of Nash equilibria for general networks and semi-convex marginal cost functions. While it is known that for m ≥ 2 users and convex marginal cost functions, no efficiency guarantee is possible, we prove that an additional differentiability assumption on marginal cost functions implies a bounded efficiency loss of 2/(2m + 1). For polynomial marginal cost functions with nonnegative coefficients, we precisely characterize the price of anarchy. We also prove that the efficiency of Nash equilibria significantly improves if all users have the same strategy space and the same utility function. We propose a class of distributed dynamics and prove that whenever a game admits a potential function, these dynamics globally converge to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that in general the only class of marginal cost functions that guarantees the existence of a potential function are affine linear functions.