Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Convex Optimization
A stackelberg game for power control and channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Capacity regions and bounds for a class of Z-interference channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Spectrum sharing between wireless networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Simultaneous Water Filling in Mutually Interfering Systems
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
The Water-Filling Game in Fading Multiple-Access Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Gaussian Interference Channel Capacity to Within One Bit
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Competition Versus Cooperation on the MISO Interference Channel
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Competitive Design of Multiuser MIMO Systems Based on Game Theory: A Unified View
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Resource allocation in protected and shared bands: uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibria
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Cooperative resource allocation games under spectral mask and total power constraints
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Power allocation games in interference relay channels: existence analysis of nash equilibria
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
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In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (N.E). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. For this reason, the spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg game where the first operator is already being deployed and the secondary operator follows next. The Stackelberg equilibrium (S.E) is reached where the best response of the secondary operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary operator's utility function. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to the centralized approach.