CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Wireless Communications
Analysis of iterative waterfilling algorithm for multiuser power control in digital subscriber lines
EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
Fading channels: information-theoretic and communications aspects
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Coding and control for communication networks
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
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We consider a wireless collision channel, shared by a finite number of mobile users who transmit to a common base station. Each user wishes to optimize its individual network utility that incorporates a natural tradeoff between throughput and power. The channel quality of every user is affected by global and time-varying conditions at the base station, which are manifested to all users in the form of a common channel state. Assuming that all users employ stationary, state-dependent transmission strategies, we investigate the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the resulting game between users. While the equilibrium performance can be arbitrarily bad (in terms of aggregate utility), we bound the efficiency loss at the best equilibrium as a function of a technology-related parameter. Under further assumptions, we show that sequential best-response dynamics converge to an equilibrium point in finite time, and discuss how to exploit this property for better network usage.