An Improved Attack on TKIP

Authors:
Finn M. Halvorsen;Olav Haugen;Martin Eian;Stig F. Mjølsnes
Affiliations:
Dep. of Telematics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway;Dep. of Telematics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway;Dep. of Telematics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway;Dep. of Telematics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
Venue:
NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Beck and Tews described the first practical cryptographic attack on IEEE 802.11i TKIP in November 2008, and this paper continues this line of protocol cryptanalysis. We show that their attack on TKIP can be used to create an ARP poisoning attack and a cryptographic DoS attack. Moreover, we are able to decrypt DHCP ACK packets, which are over 12 times longer than the ARP packet used by Beck and Tews. Our method of analysis recovers 596 bytes of keystream that can be used in new attacks on other control protocol messages.