ESAW '00 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Engineering Societies in the Agent World: Revised Papers
Ubi Lex, Ibi Poena: Designing Norm Enforcement in E-Institutions
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems II
Formalising Situatedness and Adaptation in Electronic Institutions
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems IV
A Context-Based Institutional Normative Environment
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems IV
Emergence of norms through social learning
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Adaptive Deterrence Sanctions in a Normative Framework
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Engineering open environments with electronic institutions
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Modelling flexible social commitments and their enforcement
ESAW'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Societies in the Agents World
Adaptive Deterrence Sanctions in a Normative Framework
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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Normative environments for multi-agent systems provide means to monitor and enforce agents' compliance to their commitments. However, when the normative space is imperfect, contracts to which norms apply may be unbalanced, and agents may exploit potential flaws to their own advantage. In this paper we analyze how a normative framework endowed with a simple adaptive deterrence sanctioning model responds to different agent populations. Agents are characterized by their risk tolerance and by their social attitude. We show that risk-averse or socially concerned populations cause lesser deterrence sanctions to be imposed by the normative system.