Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish routing
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
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We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks, which generalizes earlier results and can be used for the design of truthful mechanisms in the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs proportional to the usage of her edge. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with two-parameter agents , which generalizes the well-known setting of one-parameter agents by allowing a fixed cost component as part of each agent's private data. We give a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms for two-parameter agents. This characterization also motivates our choice of linear cost functions without fixed costs for the edges in the selfish routing setting.