A New Derandomization of Auctions

Authors:
Oren Ben-Zwi;Ilan Newman;Guy Wolfovitz
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Israel 31905;Department of Computer Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Israel 31905;Department of Computer Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Israel 31905
Venue:
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b *** [h ] n , has expected profit ${\mathbb E}[P(b)]$. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A , there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b , guarantees a profit of ${\mathbb E}[P(b)]/4 - O(h)$. In this paper we show that given A , there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n , guarantees a profit of ${\mathbb E}[P(b)]- O(h\sqrt{n \ln hn})$. As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.