Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2001
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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We study economic means to improve network performance in the well-known game theoretic traffic model due to Wardrop. We introduce two sorts of spam flow - auxiliary and adversarial flow - that have no intrinsic value. Auxiliary/adversarial flows are a separate commodity with the sole objective to minimize/maximize the latency at the induced Wardrop equilibrium of the selfish flow. By this means a separate access to the edges is not necessary and the latency of the regulating flow does not distort the arising latency cost. We present networks where auxiliary flow is able to improve the network performance. However, we show that the optimal auxiliary flow is NP-hard to compute and not approximable within a factor of less then $\frac 43$. The minimal amount of auxiliary flow needed to induce the best possible equilibrium is even hard to approximate by any subexponential factor. These hardness results are complemented by proving NP-hardness for the optimal adversarial flow. All hardness results hold even for single-commodity networks.