A 2-Secure Code with Efficient Tracing Algorithm
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Error- and Collusion-Secure Fingerprinting for Digital Data
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
Fingerprinting Concatenated Codes with Efficient Identification
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Traitor tracing with constant size ciphertext
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
High rate fingerprinting codes and the fingerprinting capacity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
An improvement of discrete Tardos fingerprinting codes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Optimization of Tardos's fingerprinting codes in a viewpoint of memory amount
IH'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information hiding
A short random fingerprinting code against a small number of pirates
AAECC'06 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
A family of collusion 2-secure codes
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
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In recent research on collusion-secure fingerprint codes, some relaxation of the conventional security assumption (Marking Assumption) have been introduced from a viewpoint of reality in practical situations, and several fingerprint codes have been proposed under those assumptions. In this article, we consider such a relaxed assumption and give an extension of short 2-secure codes (under Marking Assumption) recently proposed by Nuida et al. (IEICE Trans. A, 2009) to our assumption. We perform theoretical and numerical evaluation of security and required code lengths. For example, to bound the error probability by 0.01% for 10,000 users, 162-bit, 220-bit and 329-bit lengths are sufficient even if each bit of the fingerprint codeword is either flipped (in addition to other collusion attacks) with probabilities 1%, 2.5% and 5%, respectively, or erased with probabilities 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively.